The Channel Tunnel, implications for regional development in Great Britain. by MacCallum, Charles Hugh Alexander
THE CHANNEL TUNNEL
I24PLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN GREAT BRITAIN
by
CHARLES HUGH ALEXANDER MacCALLUM
B. Arch., Strathclyde University
(1967)
Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
(June 1969)
Signature of author-.
Department of frban Stu'dies and Planning, May 23, 196
Certified by 
_
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
t Pe Cha an, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students
MITLibraries
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.2800
Email: docs@mit.edu
http://libraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIMER OF QUALITY
Due to the condition of the original material, there are unavoidable
flaws in this reproduction. We have made every effort possible to
provide you with the best copy available. If you are dissatisfied with
this product and find it unusable, please contact Document Services as
soon as possible.
Thank you.
Both the Library and Archives version
of this thesis has pages that contain
poor, but legible text quality. This is the
best available copy.
THE CHANNEL TUNNEL:
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN GREAT BRITAIN
by
Charles Hugh Alexander MacCallum
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 1969
The 1960s have seen a resurgence of interest in the idea of
connecting Britain to the European mainland by means of a
tunnel under the English Channel, and the British and French
Governments have agreed that one should be built, subject to
the negotiation of satisfactory financing arrangements.
Discussion has centered on how to build a Tunnel, rather than
why, and although such a reduction of a major friction in the
system of physical relationships between Britain and the rest
of Europe is bound to cause some redistribution of locational
advantage, there has been little study - at least in Britain-
of the consequences of the decision to proceed.
This thesis considers the likely impact of a Tunnel in the
context of the main aims of current British planning policy
as it applies to regional development, and concludes that
they are at variance. At the same time, however, the Channel
Tunnel situation underlines some of the basic contradictions
inherent in present regional policy, and the thesis concludes
by discussing some recent indications of impending change in
that policy.
Thesis Supervisor : Professor John T. Howard
Head of the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
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5SUMM~ARY
The thesis compares the probable consequences of building a tunnel
under the English Channel with the current aims of regional development
policy in Britain.
A description of the geographical context of the Tunnel's proposed
location at the Straits of Dover is followed by a brief account of
the background to the current proposals. These are for a rail link with
vehicle ferrying facilities both as a cross-Channel shuttle and as
part of a system of direct links between centres in Britain and in
Europe.
The general effect of improved communications with Europe in this
region, particularly in the event of British entry into the Common
market, would be to enhance the SouthEast's relative attractiveness
to industry, and to encourage the generation of new employment and
population growth in the region.
Regional development policy in Britain, however, is primarily
aimed at the alleviation of unemployment in areas where it is
relatively high, and at the relief of congestion in the more
crowded parts of the country.
The Tunnel proposal%- seems therefore to run completely counter to
national planning policy, as the South East is in fact the most
prosperous and densely populated region in Britain, but in doing
so it also underlines some of the contradictions in current policy.
7In comparing the probable impact of the Tunnel with the aims of
present policy, the problems of continued implementation of that
policy and some indications of possible change in attitudes
toward regional development are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
9Although there have been a great many studies, and one or two false starts,
since the French engineer Mathicu suggested to Napoleon in 1802 that a tun-
nel from France to Britain might be a good idea, circumstances have never
combined for a sufficiently long time for one to be built. Since 1961,
however, both French and British governments have displayed greatly renewed
interest in the subject, and matters have progressed to the point where, on
November 18, 1968, Her Majesty's Minister of Transport told a meeting of the
Channel Tunnel Parliamentary Group: "The ctitical factor at the moment in
the choice of a private group to arrange for the financing and construction."
Indeed, true to the pattern of the Tunnel's history, digging has been under
way for some time on the French side, though the British have not quite de-
cided on the location of their end.
Debate on the Channel Tunnel has, in recent years, been limited for the most
part to the cuestion of whether it should be a tunnel - and if so, what kind
or a bridge, or a combination of the two. With attention thus focussed on
technical issues, some auite fundamental cuestions about the advisability of
a fixed link of any sort have received scant attention, and assessment of the
consenuences of providing one, in terms of nationalregional impact, has been
conspicuously absent. In a report prepared jointly by British and French
officials in 1963, the likelihood of economic repercussions, particularly of
a localised nature, within the Channel area countries was acknowledged, but
it was felt that they were impossible to assess.
Since then, there seem to have been second thoughts and some resignations,
at least among some of- these responsible for planning policy in South East
England, and studies are in progreds on the cuestion of the Tunnel's
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probable impact on that region. The first results of this work, however,
are not expected to be completed before April, 1970.
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Purpose and Eoxtent of this Thesis
It is the purpose of this thesis to consider the probable consequences of
building a Channel Tunnel, on the lines of present proposals, for planning
policy in Britain. Clearly, a reduction in the friction which the Snglish
Channel represents in the system of communications between Britain and the
rest of Europe will result not only in a redistribution of traffic, but, to
some extent, of locational advantage also, with all that that implies for
the movement of people and industry. Although many of the Tunnel's most dir-
ect effects would likely be felt in the Channel region itself, it is in the
wider context of national planning considerations that its implications will
be considered here.
The primary congerns of British regional and economic planning policy are
described more fully in Part II, but its broad aim has been to stimulate
development - with particular emphasis on the problems of unemployment -
in the economically lagging regions of the country. The emphasis of this
thesis is on the broad issue of the compatibility of the Tunnel proposals
with national policy, rather than on the detailed consequences of their im-
plementation. This is not to imply that the details are unimportant, but
that their consideration should not precede consideration of the basic ques-
tion of whether the tunnel makes sense in the context of national planning
aims. As it happens, the reverse has been the case, and it is with that
fundamental omission that the thesis is concerned.
- I Jil Ill
PART I: THE CHANNEL TUNNEL
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE TUNNEL
FIGURE 1. POPULATION DENSITY IN EUROPE. ( Areas shown solid black have
over 200 persons/square kilometre. )
Source: Der Regierungsbericht dber die Raumordnung in den Niederlanden,
Mitteilungen aus dem Institut fdr Raumordnung, Bad Godesberg,1961.
From the map in figure 1 it may clearly be seen that the most densely pop-
ulated parts of Europe form an almost continuous swathe-of development
running from the base of the Alps, broadening to encompass the Benelux
countries, and continuing through South East England to the Midlands and
South Wales. The English Channel thus not only separates Brit.gn from
Continental Europe, it also constitutes the only major break in the densest
part of this highly urbanised region.
The interactions of the Industrial *olution with existing transportation
routes and the location of natural resources has resulted in the concentra-
tion of most of Europe's heavy industry within this corridor, and has had
a profound effect on the distribution of population. For a variety of rea-
sons, the declining labour demand in many of the older, heavy industries
has not been matched everywhere by a compensating metamorphosis in the
structure of the local economy, nor perhaps by sufficient population mobility,
and there now exist several sizeable areas within this urban corridor which
have severe economic problems deriving from the advanced obsolescence of their
base activities. The Pasde-Calais, near the French end of the proposed tun-
nel, is one such area, with wages 20 per cent lower, and mortality 20 per
cent higher, than in the Paris region.
Finally, the geographical role of the Channel has changed. In addition to
providing much of Britain's overseas trade with access to the Port of London,
the Tnglish Channel constituted a significant element in Britain's defences
as recently as World War II. Traditionally, this had been the argument - per-
haps not a very good one - against the Tunnel, but with the disappearance of
the question of security, increasing emphasis on 3uropean unity has tended
FIGURE 2. CHANNEL TUNNEL ALIGNMENTS AND CONNECTING
RAILWAYS.
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to focus attenition on the Channel's role as an impediment to the movement
of people and goods between Britain and the rest of Europe.
THE PRESENT PROPOSALS:
Background.
Why build a Fixed Link?
Construction and Location.
Types and Capacity of Service Proposed.
19
Colorful and intergsting though the Tunnel's history is, a detailed pre-
sentation would be inappropriate here. A chronology is provided in
Appendix I, and those interested in a fuller treatment are referred to
the bibliography, and particularly to the study by Slater and Barnett. The
following section is therefore confined to an outline of the main events
since the establishment of the Channel Tunnel Study Group, on 26 July 1957.
The Group was set up on the initiative of the dispossessed Compagnie Finan-
ciere de Suez, and comprised the following:
1. The Channel Tunnel Company Limited, (in which the British Transport Com-
mission is a shareholder.)
2. The SocietK Concessionaire du Chemin de Fer Sous-Marin Entre la France
et l'Angleterre, (in which the Sociftg Nationale des Chemins de Fer is
the main shareholder, constituting, with its associate The International
Road Federation (Paris), the French Group.)
3. The Compagnie Financilre de Suez.
4. Technical Studies Incorporated, of New York.
The members of the Group contributed equally towards joint studies which
included the following:
A. A Traffic Survey (1) examining basic operational factors for the separate
assumptions of a road or rail tunnel, analysing present traffic between
1igland and the Continent, its rate of growth, and of the traffic which
would be diverted or created by the new route, and a study of charges 'and
revenue.
(1) The Economist Intelligence Unit, London. Societe d'Etudes Techniques et
3conomiques, Paris. De Leuw, Cather and Company, Chicago.
MMM
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B. Technical Studies comprising:
a. Geological studies. (2)
b. Study of engineering methods, i.e. bored tunnel, immersed
tube, bridge, and composite construction.
c. Design for a bored tunnel, consisting of a rail tunnel and/
or a road tunnel, separate but adjacent.
d. Scheme for an immersed tube. (3)
e. Bridge study. (4)
f. 3stimated costsand:revenues for different types of construction.
C. Financial study of the implications of the traffic and engineering studies.
D. Legal study of the problems involved in creating a public service common
to two countries, assuming financing and organisation by an international,
privately-owned company.
The group's subsequent report, published on 28th March 1960, favoured, "in the
first stage at least, a railway tunnel, bored or immersed" with facilities
for the transportation of road vehicles by rail.
In December 1960, the Socicete d'Etude du Pont sur la Manche undertook fur-
ther studies culminating, in October 1961, in a proposal for a 21 mile road
and rail btidge linking Cap Blanc Nez to South Forelarid.
(2) J. M. Bruckshaw, Imperial College, London; J. Goguel, Ecole des Mines,
Paris; W. 0. Smith, U. S. Geological Survey.
(3) Sir William Halcrow and Partners; Messrs. Livesey and Henderson; Messrs.
Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, London; Socieft4 Genrale d'Exploitations
Industrielles, Paris.
(4) Messrs. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, New York.
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On 17th November 1-961, the British and French Ministers of Transport de-
cided to set up a working group to look into and report-on these two sets
of proposals. Having considered the traffic, technical, legal, economic,
and financing problems, the group concluded (1) that of the proposals they
had studied, a tunnel would be preferable both to a bridge and "to the con-
tinuous use and development of established means of transport."
In 1966 the British and French governments agreed that the Channel Tunnel
should be built provided that satisfactory financial arrangements could be
agreed. Discussions on the choice of a group to arrange financing and
construction continue. When a group has been decided upon, it will carry
out a financial and technical feasbility study before approval is given for
them to finance construction. The operation of the tunnel will be by a
public authority comprising French and British officials.
Why Build a Fixed Link?
As remarked in the Introduction, one of the more curious aspects of the
present chapter in the Tunnel's long history is the concentration of debate
on how to build a link, rather than why. As The Times has observed; "..... the
extraordinary thing is that no official case has ever been made for it: not
the kind of case, that is, that ought to have been made for a project 6f such
(1) Proposals for a Fixed Channel Link, Cmnd. 2137. IMSO, September 1963,
London.
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magnitude, with important reprecussions on regional and economic planning,
and on our physical and political links with Europe." (1)
The Franco-British group who prepared the report presented to Parliament by
the Minister of Transport in September 1963 did not bfPerki ., consider
that the repercussions would be significant, but also stated, in the same
breath, that -they thought them impossible to assess. The group's economic
assessment of each system was "limited to the costs and benefits of its
operators and users". (2) .ven this, however, they acknowledged to contain
a number of uncertainties, such as current developments in transportation
technology, and unquantifiable elements such as amenity, which it was agreed
would result in a difference in traffic generating power of a tunnel com-
pared to that of a bridge.
Beyond this, the services which a fixed link would offer were summarised as
increased cross-Channel traffic capacity, and a reduction in surface travel
time, which would, for example, make the journey between London and Paris
almost as cuick by tail as by air.
There have been isolated cries of dissent in the correspondence columns of
the usual newspapers, accusing the Government of, among other things, "a
conspiracy of silence", and of plotting the destruction of a large part of
(1) Article by Michael 3aily; The Times, April 3, 1968.
(2) P. 32, Proposals for a Fixed Channel Link. op.cit.
23
"what has always been known as the Garden of Angland". (1) Generally,
however, the mass of the British public seems to have assumed - and its
Government has indeed left it guessing - that the decision to build a
Channel Tunnel is only natural in view of Britain's new-found interest in
her affairs with Europe.
Construction and Location.
As present proposals,stand, the Channel Tunnel. would consist of two parallel
single-track railway tunnels, each 21'4" in diameter, with a saml1er service
tunnel, 12'6" diameter, between and slightly below them. The Tunnel, which
would probably be bored. through the Lower Chalk, would rise to a peak in
mid-channel, draining to coastal pumping stations. It would be located at
approximately the narrowest part of the Straits of Dover, and its total length
would he 32 miles, of which 23 miles would be under the sea. The two terminals,
44 miles apart, would be at Sangatte, four miles southwest of Calais, ahd at
a still underdetermined location between Ashford and Folkstone on the British
side. (2) It is estimated that the tunnel could be in operation by 1976.
(1) Lt. Col. P. L. Murray Lawes: Leter to The Times, April 8, 1963.
(2) In a paper dated November 19, 1963, the Ministry of Transport considers
Cheriton and Sellindge to be the options. (The Channel Tunnel: A Dis-
cussion of Terminal Reouirements on the British Side and of Possible
Locations for Terminal Facilities in Kent. Kent County Council, Dec-
ember, 1968.)
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Types and Caacity of Service Pr2oosed.
The Tunnel would have 25KV overhead electrification, and would be used
by the following types of service
(a) Through rail freight services ( including freightliner trains)
between centres in Britain and on the Continent;
(b) Fast inter-city passenger and car-carrying trains between centres
in Britain (not only London) and on the Continent (not only Paris)
(c) A fast and frequent shuttle service of specially designed ',ferry-
trains" running between terminals near the Tunnel portals and
carrying up to 300 road vehicles ( cars, caravans, lorriescoachesi)
per train. This ferry service would have a peak hour capacity of
12 trains, or 3,600 vehicles, per hour in each direction , 6ver
an eighteen-hour day. Transit time would be about 35 minutes, plus
30 minutes for waiting, loading, unloading, and customs inspection.
(d) Possibly additional passenger trains of standard continental rolling
stock and freight trains handled by continental locomotives. Because
of loading gauge restrictions, such trains could run in the U.K.
only as far as terminals near the Tunnel portal.
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PART II : GREAT BRITAIN
TRANSPORTATION.
(a) Without the Tunnel.
This section describes the main lines of the national transportation
network, including Britain's links with continental Europe, as it is
now and, where sufficient information is available, as it seems likely
to develop. The description is organized by mode, and each section
includes a more detailed treatment of the present and predicted posi-
tion in South East England, where the impact of a tunnel will, be more
directly felt. Throughout the section, extensive use has been made of
maps. In the vicinity of the London-Paris-Brussels triangle however,
the patterns of activity are so extremely complex and overlapping
that, in the interests of clarity, the information has been repeated,
this time by mode.
The National Network.
From the map in figure 3, showing the main arteries in Britain's trans-
portation system, two facts are immediately apparent. First, national :
and internal communicktions are focussed on and dominated by London.
Second, the system is predominantly north-south oriented, the two main
land routes flanking the central spine of mountains and running suffi-
ciently far inland to avoid being obstructed by the several estuaries
which cut deeply into the main land mass, a pattern which differs little
from that established by the Romans.
Cross-Channel Traffic.
The passenger and vehicular sectors of cross-Channel trafficare highly
seasonal. Twenty-five per cent of the annual total is handled in August
28
FIGURE 3. COMMUNICATIONS IN BRITAIN
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alone, and 70 per cent within the four month period from June to
September. Within this seasonal concentration, there is particularly
heavy traffic at week-ends. Although the sea routes still carry the
bulk of cross-Channel passenger traffic, the proportion going by air
is increasing, particularly between Britain and the Low Countries.
MAJOR ROADS IN BRITAIN (1968)
,-- 1CL rITSH gCAQ FoATOM
FIGURE 4
Roads in Great Britain.
The form of Britain's public road system is derived from the interaction of
the Roman system, conceived from a military standpoint, and the later Anglo-
Saxon network, designed to meet the needs of an agricultural society.
The accompanying map, figure h, shows the main lines of the motorway (similar
to U.S. freeways) system presently under construction, as it now exists and
as it is proposed. As with communications generally, the overall pattern is
one of north-south orientation with radiAl development around London. The
system, as can be seen from the map, is by no means without interruption at
present. Further, because of delays and lack of money, the Government's target
of 1000 miles of motorway by 1973 is certain not to be met, and even if it were,
it would be quite insufficient to provide an adequate system between the South-
East and the lagging regions of Wales and the North.
Roads in the Southeast
Although the South East Economic Planning Council reported (1) that the location
of existing route network in the region was well suited to anticipateddevelopment,
it stressed that its capacity was not. It pointed to a 'very fast' increase in
the amount of traffic, and in view of the expected importance of the passenger
sector in total tunnel traffic, it is worth noting that while the number of all
(1) Strategy for the South East. A first report by the South East Economic
Planning Council. HMSO 1967.
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FIGURE 5. ROADS IN THE SOUTH EAST.
vehicles in the South East doubled between 1951 and 1964, private cars in-
creased almost threefold, and their number is expected to have doubled again,
to approximately six million, by the late 1970's.
The council frankly recognised that the investment resources available were
incapable of meeting the predicted demands for new constructior ) but established
certain 'strategic priorities'. The map in figure 5 summarises these re-
commendations. Finally, the long standing economic plight of the United King-
dome has caused highway construction programmes to fall behind schedule, and
it is by no means clear that even these 'strategic prioritiest will be met.
Special importance is given to ring road construction, with the intention of
keeping as much traffic as possible - 'e.g. from the Channel Tunnel' - out of
the London area, and the urgency is also stressed of substantially improving
the south coast route linking eastwards with the developments in Kent and the
Channel Tunnel, and westwards to South Hampshire.
Railways in BritAin.
Rail communications (see figure 6) in Britain, like roads, focus on London,
with relatively poor east-west communication between the main lines to the
north.
Railways in the South East
A map of the main rail routes in South East England is given in figure 7.
CAsErjces
FIGURE 6 MAIN RAIL ROUTES
Main lines
Other routes
FIGURE 7. RAILWAYS IN THE SOUTH EAST, (Source: A Strategy for
the S.E.)
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The lines radiating to the south and to Essex are heavily used, (1) but there
is considerable unused capacity on trunk lines to the north and north west.
Although improvements and further electrification of existing lines are pro-
posed, no new routes - other than the Tunnel - or major increases in capacity
are considered necessary. Official studies on the probable effect of both
the Channel Tunnel and the third London airport have not, however, been com-
pleted, although naturally both factors are expected to make an impact.
Shipping.
Although there is some sea traffic between continental Europe and the more
northerly east coast ports, such as Hull and Leith, the great bulk of sea
trade with Europe is handled by the ports between Southampton and Harwich.
The ports in the south east handle more than 35 per cent of Britain's total
freight traffic, mostly on the Thames and Medway, but also through Southamp-
ton. Although the remaining ports account for only fiveper cent of the
region's freight traffic, the short sea routes are heavily used, and expanding
fast.
By far most of the region's passenger traffic is cross-Channel, but the deep
sea passenger traffic in and out of Southampton accounts for 65 percent of the
national total.
(1) Of the 1.2 million people entering central London each morning rush
hour, 40 per cent travel by British Rail, and a further 50 per cent
by London Transport.
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In the future there is likely to be continued expansion of the London docks
in a down river direction, and further expansion of facilities for handling
container traffic.
Main Channel shipping lanes are shown, with typical travel times, on the
map in figure 8.
Finally, developments in 'ro-ro' (roll on, roll off) ships and containeri-
zation have caused sea freight rates to fall by as much as 40 per cent, and
high capital investments have been made in the container field, with British
Rail undercutting their rivals to gain the high utilization required.
Air Transport
Although there are several direct flights from the provinces, most air ser-
vices between centres in Britain and those in Europe go through London,
utilising the capital's 611 routes to the continent, a factor which has con-
tributed to the intensity of traffic on certain internal lines. The Glasgow-
London service, for example, with 700,000 passengers in 1968, is the busiest
in Europe.
In 1966, London's two international airports handled 13.5 million passengers,
which is 13 per cent more than the previous year. Freight traffic is increasing
by about 20 per cent annually. A third major airport, to handle all types of
traffic, long medium, and short haul, is proposed, although its location remains
undecided.
Several smaller airports in the South East ferry cars, passengers, and limited
amounts of freight across channel. Until the recent advent of hovercraft ser-
vices, these provided the only alternative to the traditional ferries for
BIRMtA.GHAM
BRUSSELS
' ~LILLE
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car ferry service - c -
MAP OF CROSS-CHANNEL AIR SERVICESFIGURE 9
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motorists, and are well patronised, although delays during peak season often
cancel out any time advantage over other modes.
Hovercraft
The first regular cross-Channel hovercraft service was inaugurated in the
summer of 1968 by British Rail's Seaspeed organization, operating a
$4,200,000 SRN "Mountbatten" craft between Dover and Boulogne. As a com-
mercial proving exercise, the operation was generally successful, and a
second craft of the same type will be added in 1969. Each craft can carry
254 passengers and 30 cars, and takes 40 minutes to complete the crossing.
A new service will also be opened this year between Calais and the newly
constructed terminal at Ramsgate. Operated by Hover1loyd, Ltd. this service,
the most ambitious commercial application of hovercraft yet, will make up to
20 crossings daily, with a journey time of 40 minutes.
noThe outlook for passenger hdVercraft on Channel routes is by/means certain, but
it would appear to be promising. The outlook for freight traffic is less so.
The amount of time saved is of less value than it is to passengers, and the
cost is higher. For high value cargo, air freighters may prove faster and
cheaper. (1)
The map in figure 10 shows the existing routes.
(1) The Times, (Business News), April 2, 1969
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TRANSPORTATION :
(b) With the Tunnel.
This section deals with the effects of the tunnel's completion upon
existing patterns of passenger, vehicular and freight traffic. The
facilities typically provided by existing mode of cross channel trans-
portation are compared in terms of time, cost and convenience with the
sort of service envisaged by the current tunnel proposals outlined in
the previous section.
The investigations carried out on behalf of the Channel Tunnel Study
Group represent the most up-to-date comprehensive source available, but
the consultants' report (1) was published in 1960, on the basis of data
collected in 1958, so that the last full year for which information was
obtained was 1957. There have been developments since then which ought
to be taken into consideration. Apart from technblogical advances, such
as hovercraft development and the growth of containerization, the esti-
mated cost of the tunnel has gone up considerably. Prom the $338.4 mil-
lion of the 1963 proposal (2), the estimate has risen to $720 million,
and another $24 million is added with every year that passes.
1. Channel Tunnel Traffic and Revenue Summary . op. cit.
2. After subtracting.-a credit of $57.6 million which the sponsors
allowed themselves for the sale of ships and aircraft put out of
business by the Tunnel.
Rail/Sea Passenger Traffic.
At present, the "Golden Arrow" train-ferry-train service via Dover and
Calais takes eight hours. The "Night-Ferry" which operates via Dunkerque,
and has through sleeping cars, takes eleven hours. Overall trip time
between London and Paris rail terminals via the Channel Tunnel would be
about four and a half hours, offering a saving of about three and a half
hours over a fast, rail service. The introduction of direct services
between provincial British cities and Europe would offer even greater
savings.
It is proposed that the Tunnel charges would be similar to those on the
present Dover-Calais ferries, so no change in overall rail fares is anti-
cipated.
Obviously, a tunnel route would avoid the present inconvenience of inter-
mediate changes from train to boat and back again. There has been some
discussion of the problem of the stress involved in such a long tunnel
trip, but from the precedents of the London tube and the Paris Metro, it
seems unlikely that this will pose serious problems to many people, and
will probably be seen as fair exchange by those prone to seasickness.
Of the eleven main cross-channel sea routes ( excluding hovercraft
routes ) presently operating, the Channel Tunnel Study Group's consultants
were instructed to assume that six now operated by the British and French
Railways would be discontinued on the opening of the tunnel. This would
45
represent approximately half of all passengers by sea in 1957. ( see
table below).
Sea Passengers by Route in 1957 ( excluding those in vehicles )
Route Carried by Sea
in 1957
Percent of
Total
To be discontinued
Dover-Boulogne
Dover-Dunkerque
Dover-Calais
Newhaven-Dieppe
Folkestone-Boulogne
Folkestone-Calais
Total to be discontinued
To remain
Dover-Ostend
Harwich-Hook
Southampton-Le Havre
Harwich-Esbjerg
Southampton-St.Malo
Other Routes
Total to remain
Total carried by sea
35,000
88,000
387,000
322,000
320,000
377,000
1,529,000
868,000
478,000
57,000
56,000
35,000
168,000
1,662,000
3,191,000
Source: Channel Tunnel Traffic and Revenue Summary, Section 1. op.cit.
1.1
2.8
12.1
10.1
10.0
11.8
47.9
27.2
14.9
1.8
1.8
1.1
5.3
52.1
100.0
Air Passenger Trafic
Between city centres, the London-Paris journey by air takes approximately
four hours ( less than one of which is actually flying time ). The pro-
jected rail route via the tunnel would thus still be slower, but only
marginally so, at four and a half hours. It would be cheaper, at $11.20
second class, compared to $22 tourist by air.
The coach-air-coach service between London and Paris via Lympne and
3eauvais, with a journey time of six hours and a single fare of $11.80
would appear unable to compete with the four and a half hours and $11.20
offered by the tunnel route, on which intermediate changes would be
unnecessary.
Passenger Survey
During peak and off seasons in 1958, origin-destination surveys were
carried out on all main cross-Channel passenger routes to determine
travel patterns and the reasons for choice of route and travel mode.
Analysis of the data indicated a direct relationship between the cost
of using a route and the number of passengers who used it. Allocation
curves were derived-to assign passengers to the Channel Tunnel. The
number of passengers estimated to be divertible increased with the
relative saving offered by the Tunnel. Approximately 68 per cent of
the passenger traffic estimated to be diverted to the Channel Tunnel
will come from the discontinuation of the six sea routes mentioned.
The remainder were reckoned to come from continuing sea routes and
some of the existing short haul air routes.
Existing and Estimated Diverted Passenger Traffic (1)
Passengers
Sea- Discontinued routes
Retained routes
Sub-Total
1957
Actual
1,529,000
1,662,000
3,191,000
1965
Estimated
Without
Tunnel
2,170,000
2,358,000
4,528,000
1965
Estimated
Diverted
to Tunnel
2,170.000
428,000
2,598,000
Air- Regular Route
London-Paris
London-Belgium
London-Netherlands
Other Routes
Sub-Total
TOTAL
1,032,000
1,527,000
2,559,000
5,750,000
2,837,000
4,043,000
6,880,000
11,408,000
1. Source: Channel Tunnel Traffic and Revenue Summary, Section 1, opcit.
532,000
50,000
582,000
3,180,000
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Projected train times between city centres on routes between London and
Paris, London and the Netherlands, London and Belgium, compare quite
favourably with air travel times, and it was estimated that 70 per cent
of these constituted potential passengers, 25 per cent of which would
be directed to the Tunnel.
Future Growth of assenger traffic
The consultants estimated that passenger traffic would increase approxi
mately in proportion to the increase of national income in the countries
served by the Tunnel, resulting in a projected increase in the number
of passengers carried, from 3,180,000 in 1965 to 5,092,000 in 1935.
Vehicular Traffic :. General
In 1957,81.6 per cent of 285,000 accompanied vehicles crossed the Channel
by sea, and 18.4 per cent by air. The average vehicle occupancy was just
over three persons. Services were fully booked during the peak months -
particularly August - with a great deal of unused capacity during the
rest of the year,
Of the 233,254 accompanied vehicles which crossed the Channel on six main
routes, 165,789 were carried on four routes which would be discontinued
on the opening of the Tunnel,
Substantial numbers of vehicles are ferried across the Channel by air.
In 1951, 52,600 ( of which 44,600 were passengerevehicles ) did so
compared with 2,700 in 1949.
The tunnel charge of $20 for a private car with three passengers would
be half that of the cheapest air ferry. Origin-destination surveys of
accompanied vehicles showed a direct relationship between the cost of
a particular route and the number of motorists using it. Time, distan-
ce and fares were assigned monetary values, and allocation curves de-
rived to assign motorists to the Channel Tunnel. Two-thirds of those
divertible were estimated to come from discontinued sea routes, the
remainder from air and other sea routes.
Induced Increase in Vehicular Traffic
In the years immediately following the replacement of a ship or ferry
service by a form of fixed link, additional traffic is generated,
partly because of improved service, bur also because of lower travel
costs and changes in travel ( vacation and business ) habits. Relating
the percentage of generated traffic to the fare charged, the consultants
estimate that generated traffic would be approximately 60 per cent of
diverted traffic.
Finally, relating growth in accompanied vehicular traffic to increased
vehicle registration, and that in turn to rise in per capita GNP, the
1965-35 traffic estimates were as follows :
Number of
Year Vehicles
1965 676,000
1970 833,000
1975 990,000
1980 1,127,000
1985 1,196,000
( Source Channel Tunnel Traffic and Revenue Surmary , op.cit. )
Since the preparation of the consultants' report, the general sensitive
economic situation in Europe, and particularly in Britain, has put a
brake on the growth of tourism, and also on the increase in numbers
of motor vehicles registered. In this connection, it should be noted
that 75 per cent of cross-Channel vehicular traffic is registered in
Britain.
vreight
Of Britain's 5,700,000 tons of imports and 4,800,000 tons of exports
in 1957, two-thirds were in bulk form and were carried at rates so low
that the Tunnel charge of $5 per ton could not compete. Of the bulk
imports, 70 per cent were fertilizers, grain, ores and scrap, and 20
per cent coal and coke. Bulk exports were mainly coal and coke. Of the
remaining 3,500,000 tons not in bulk form, it was estimated that one
third would be diverted to the tunnel. Nearly 500,000 tons of freight
a year, or 15 per cent of the Tunnel's potential total is at present
carried by the two rail ferries and the Tilbury-Antwerp vehicular ferry
as follows :
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Dover-Dunkerque 240.000 tons (1957)
Harwich-Zeebrugge 225.000 tons
Tilbury-Antwerp 7.000 tons (20.000 in 1958 )
Hovercraft
Since the Channel Tunnel Study Group's consultants prepared their
estimates, hovercraft services have begun to operate on a commercial
basis between Dover and Boulogne, and from Ramsgate to Calais or Ostend.
Crossing times are similar to the projected rail time via the Tunnel,
and the cost is highly competitive. Dover-Boulogne by British Rail's
Seaspeed service costs $7.20 single for passengers, compared to the
Tunnel's projected fare of $6.85. Even more interesting is this year's
$9.60 single fare for the bus-hovercraft-bus service from Lodon to Paris
or $9.30 to Ostend.
These prices would appear to be thoroughly competitive on ferry shuttle
traffic, although about 90 minutes slower on, for instance, the Iondon-
Paris trip. The Ministry of Transport has asked that additional work
be done on the competitiveness of these services, and also on the matter
of containerization, to ascertain their effect on the economic viability
of the Tunnel.
For freight transportation, as remarked earlier, there is no indication
yet that hovercraft will be sufficiently competitive to upset existing
trends.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN BRITAIN
52FIGURE 12
STANDARD REGIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN.
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This section deals with regional development policy in Great Britain-
so far as one may be said to exist on a national scale. Its main concerns
will be identified, the present situation and trends in these areas
described, and current policy summarised. A later section will look at
how these factors are likely to be affected by the sorts of changes in
the transportation network which would result from the construction of
a Channel Tunnel.
In view of the relatively widespread and long-standing acceptance of
planning, not to say Government intervention,in Britain, it is surprising
to reflect that the first comprehensive regional plan ( for Central
Scotland ) did not appear till 1964. Others have followed hard on its
heels, but so far no mechanism seems to have emerged to ensure the
matching of these individually constructed pieces to form a coherent
whole.
Although no truly comprehensive national plan exits, there is, however,
national policy on certain issues such as regional economic development.
Since its beginnings in the late 1920s, Government policy in this field
has been primarily an employment policy - or, rather, an unemployment
policy - aimed at reducing the level of unemployment in those places
where it has been markedly higher than the national average.
While the aim has remained the same, the strategies adopted over the
years have varied. Initially, the emphasis was on the movement of labour,
first in mininglater in other industries, from areas of high unemployment
to more prosperous regions, and it is ironic to reflect that grants were
actually available to enable people to migrate south and east. Although
this policy was coupled with a retraining scheme, without an accompanying
increase in the aggregate demand for labour, the net effect was to re-
distribute unemployment, rather than to reduce it in any real sense.
As one Lanarkshire M.P. put it , some thirty years later, there were
unemployed men teaching other unemployed men a new skill, which would
leave them unemployed. (1) The relevance of this to present policy is,
quite simply, that public dislike of policies involving transference
of labour, and scepticism about training schemes, was greatly strength-
ened by the failure of these early efforts.
Having rendered the policy of moving people to jobs politically un-
acceptable by failing to couple it with real economic growth, successive
Governments since the late 1930s have concentrated instead on trying
to move jobs to people. It may be argued that this is not really very
different, that in economic terms the second approach may be more
disastrous than the first, and that to treat unemployment as the
problem rather than a symptom of one is altogether the wrong approach.
In any case the uneven distribution of unemployment has not only
persisted, but has changed little in form, although levels of un-
employment are genrally lower than before World War II. The areas
most affected are Scotland, Wales, the North of England, certain parts
(1) Tom Fraser, M.P. for Hamilton. Hansard, April 8, 1963.
of Lancashire, and parts of Cornwall and Devon. Some of these regions
are of course agricultural, but of the others, many were among the
first in Britain to industrialise, and became increasingly specialised
in and dependent upon activities such as coal and steel production,
shipbuilding, textile manufacture, and heavy engineering. The demand
for labour in these industries has, however, been declining since the
1920s, and the newer consumer-oriented industries which began to be
established, particularly after World War I, tended to locate near to
the rich markets of the Midlands and the South.
Various frictions within the situation have inhibited the development
of market solutions. Wages have been downardly inelastic, and no wage
differential emerged, even under conditions of widely varying levels
of unemployment, sufficient to cause business to move of its own free
will. Finally, any tendency there might have been for people to follow
jobs, or such wage differentials as did develop, has been greatly
hampered by the severe housing shortage, particularly in the more
prosperous areas, where the price of land has risen sharply.
With no market solution forthcoming, and with policies involving the
fostering of migration discredited, governmental intervention, since
the Special Areas Act of 1934, has focussed on the creation of jobs in
areas of high unemployment by inducements to industry to go there,
and the discouragement or prevention of development in areas where
unemployment levels are low.
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The principal means of implementation have been in the form of loans
and grants available to firms prepared to set up in Development Areas,
and a system of Industrial Development Certificates which applies to
all industrial buildings over 5000 square feet in area. I.D.C.s are
automatically granted if a firm wants to build in a Development Area,
but are refused in more prosperous areas ( generally south and east of
Stoke-on-Trent ) unless the Board of Trade can be convinced that such
a development is incapable of being carried out reasonably successfully
in a Development Area.
This has not always had the desired effect. Some firms which have been
refused permission to develop in the location of their choice have
simply decided not to expand at all; others have made more intense
use of existing premises, and last - but not least - some have responded
to Government interference by going outside Britain altogether.
These policies have, to their considerable detriment, been subject to
a " stop-go " form of implementation as the country's financial crises
wax and wane; the prompt de-listing of development areas as soon as
unemployment drops below the critical level does not produce a
climate conducive to sound industrial planning. Finally there has
been a drastic lack of coordination among the various Government
departments involved. The Board of Trade. however, is quite explicit
1. The FEonomist , July 22, 1961 .
about the independence of its decisions on employment policy from
national economic considerations, a point of view not shared by the
Treasury, If the Board of Trade were advised that a firm would be
viable in Durham or Fife, the Board would not consider whether the
national economy would be better served by the firm's being placed
in the South of England. (t) In a statement to the Select Committee,
a Board of Trade official stated that " in one sense one could say
that it ( expenditure on local employment policy) was all of a
social service nature". (2)
A detailed critique of regional policy is not relevant here (3);
what it is iaulptant to make clear is that,in spite of the lack of
coordination among the Board of Trade, the Treasury, the Ministry of
Transport and the other departments concerned, the first objective of
regional development policy in Britain emerges quite clearly as the
alleviation of regional differentials in unemployment levels, irres-
pective of whether the measures necessary to achieve this end are of
benefit to the nation's economy as a whole.
1. Seventh Report from the Estimates Committee, Session 1962-63,
Administration of the Local Enployment Act, minutes of evidence,
question 264.
2. Ditto, question 1323.
3. A good short one exists, by Allan J. Odber, in " Area Redevelopment
Policies in Britain and the Couni5ies of the Common Market ", prepared
by the Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA, and published by
the U.S Department of Commerce . January 1965
-I---
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The unemployment situation in the various regions in recent years
is given in the table below, and the map in figure 12
extent of the designated Development areas.
Unemployment Rates, by Region 19 -62 Monthly Averages
Regions 1959 1960. 1961
shows the
Average-'
1962 1949-62
Liondon and South Eastern 1. 3 0. 9 1. 0 1. 3 1. 1
Southern 1. 5 1. 2 1. 1 1. 4 1. 2
SouthoWestern 2. 2 1. ? 1. 4 1. 8 1. 6
Midland 1. 5 1. 0 1. 4 1. 8 1. 0
North Midland 1. 5 1. 1 1. 0 1. 4 - 9
East and West Ridings of Yorkshire 1. 9 1. 2 1. 0 1. 6 1. 2
North Western 2. 8 1. 9 1. 6 2. 6 2. 0
Northern 3. 3 2. 8 2. 5 3. 8 2. 5
Scotland 4. 4 3. 6 3. 1 3. 8 3. 1
Wales 3. 8 2. 7 2. 6 3. 8 3. 0
Great Britain 2. 2 1. 6 1. 6 2. 1 1. 6
The second major concern of regional policy in Britain, related to the
first, is the matter of population distribution, and particularly of
congestion in large urban areas. The effect of migration is to aggra-
vate not only the problems of areas which the government sees as
already congested, but also those of the declining areas. The selec-
tive nature of voluntary migration has caused the age distribution in
these areas to become steadily more lop-sided, with the labor force
deteriorating into a pool of obsolete skills.
In 1937, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial
Population ( Barlow Commission ) was formed " To inquire into the
causes which have influenced the present geographical distribution
of the industrial population of Great Britain and the probable direction
of any change in that distribution in the future; to consider what social,
economic or strategical disadvantages arise from the concentration of
industries or of the industrial population in large towns or in parti-
cular areas of the country; and to report what remedial measures if any
should be taken in the national interest. "
This was the first time an official body was implicitly asked to examine
facts and trends in the related problems of urban congestion and regio-
nal stagnation. The Commission stated: " The disadvantages in many, if
not in most of the great industrial concentrations do constitute se-
rious handicaps and even in some respects dangers to the nation's life
and development and we are of the opinion that definite action should
be taken by the Government toward remedying them,". It is unfortunate
that they were not asked to, and did not, consider the advantages as
well as the disadvantages of concentration.
The commissioners were not unanimous in their recommendations. The
majority report advocated a ban on the establishment of new inrdustry
in London and the Home Counties, and the " creation of more fa :oura-
ble conditions of life and work in other parts of the country " to
counteract the attraction of London.
A minority of three proposed the formation of a new Ministry, to be
responsible for a continuous review and a general control over the
- 1 21
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ever changing industrial and social environment. Neither report was
accepted, and responsibility for the various components of what might
have been- a national planning policy was dispersed among several Govern-
ment departments. None the less, congestion has remained a major
concern, and considerable progress has been made in the overspilling
of population from centres such as London and Glasgow to New Towns
and other areas.
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National Population Growth and Density.
In mid-1968, the estimated population of the 94,214 square miles which
make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was
55,459,000. Current projections by the Government Actuary's Department
in conjunction with the Registrars General suggest an increase of rather
more than two million people by 1975, taking into consideration factors
such as the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, a net loss by migra-
tion, and a downward trend in the nation's birth rate. The total popu-
lation for the year 2000 is presently estimated at 70,339,000, or an
increase of just over 20 per cent on the figure for 1969.(1).
The present overall factor of 588 persons/square mile places Britain
among the more crowded countries in the world, although in a purely
European context the Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany all have
higher densities. Of these, however, only the Netherlands with 969
persons/square mile surpasses the figure for England alone, of 897
persons/square mile. (2)
(1) Annual Abstract of Statistics. HMSO, 1968.
(2) Rad McNally World Atlas. Rand McNally and Co., 1968.
- - - - -0 Im
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Regional Distribution.
It can be seen from the preceding passage that the distribution of
population among the regions is uneven. With just over half the land area,
England has over 80 per cent of the total United Kingdom population.
Furthermore, distribution within England itself is uneven, the great
majority of people being concentrated in the urban areas of the Eidlands
and the South. The South East region alone contains over 35 per cent of
the United Kingdom total, with Greater London, dominating the admi-.
nistrative, cultural, and commercial life of the country, accounting
for some eight million.
To a considerable extent, the general picture of national population
distribution reflects patterns of activity which evolved during the
Industrial Revolution. Although the industries of that period have in
many cases been replaced in significance by other, newer industries,
often in different locations, the former pattern of population
distribution has tended to linger on. Despite a distinct sluggishness
in the redistribution of population to fit 20th century patterns of
industrial location, the general trend since World War II has none
the less been one of movement particulary of young skilled people
from areas of high unemployment to those where it has been lower. The
steady outflow from Scotland, Wales, and the North of England, with a
consequent depopulation of the northern and upland areas of Britain,
63
160-
140 -
FROM OUTSiDE EPGLCAND7
ANED WA L-5
NET MIGRATION BAL. 
o -TO REST OF ENC,ANb W/ALES,
80
4o -
4o
20
0
2.19G2/3 19631
19GYG2.
( S.E. REGION)NET CIVILAN MIGRATIONF IGURE 13.
64
has brought some net movement, particulary into the London area.
As figure 13 shows, the "drift to the South East" is no longer the signi-
ficant element in interregional movement that it was previously, nor
has its rate of natural increase been as high as those of Scotland,
the North of England, or the Midlands. Nevertheless, the percentage of
the national population already living in the South East is so high that
even a modest rate of growth involves absolute numbers which are very
large indeed.(1)
Home population Million
1951 1961 1964 1965 1966
South East Region. 15.2 16.4 16.8 17.0 17.1
England and Wales. 43.8 46.2 47.4 47.8 48.1
United Kingdom. 50.3 52.8 54.1 54.4 54.7
The additional demands generated by the continuing overspill of population
from London further complicate the problems of coping with growth and
conserving amenity in the country's most densely populated region.
1. A Strategy for the South East. HMSO,1967.
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Redistribution of Locational Advantage
The preceding section described how traffic distribution might be
affected by the Tunnel. These changes would alter the balance of
locational advantage within the South East region, in Britain as a
whole, and to some extend in a wider context also.
Although the appearance of the hovercraft and the container ships as
competitors complicates matters, the immediate effect of the Tunnel
to
in Britain would certainly be/concentrate much of the cross-Channel
traffic, presently dispersed among the seaports and airfields of the
south and east coasts, upon Ashford, with a corresponding decline
initially, at least, in the economies of the coast ports. More impor-
tant in a national sense, though, is the fact that whatever the environ-
mental consequences of catering, in this densely populated region, for
the increased and concentrated traffic which will result, improved
access to Europe ( by whatever means) can only make the South East
0
a mre attractive location for industry than it is now. Any additional
development resulting from this increased attractiveness to industry
would impose ,of course, its own traffic demands upon the confessedly
inadequate road system of the region. (1)
A corollary of the South East's increased attractiveness to industry
is a decrease in the relative attractiveness of other regions of Britain
(1) Strategy for the South East op. cit.
now
particularly those without direct acce3 to the Tunnel, or too incon-
veniently located, because of distance or poor communications, for it
to make any favourable difference.
On the other side of the Channel the repercussions of improved trans.
portation would be felt in a very different context. In the relatively
impoverished North East of France, unlike the prosperous and densely
developed South East of England, land and labour are comparatively
cheap, and the area is actually conveniently located to more major
European centres than is its British counterpart. The diversion of
traffic at present flowing directly between Britain, Belgium, the
Netherlands and other European counries to the Tunnel, and therefore
through France, would place the Calais region in a highly strategic
position at the crossroads of the revised regional communication
pattern.
It should be noted that this locational advantage is not without
cost to France's neighbours. For example, Ostend with its inter-
dependent base activities of tourism and transportation would lose
heavily, to the considerable gain of Calais. Reference has already
been made to the improved position in which the Calais region will
find itself, relative tb the South East of England. Finally the
abandonment of modes of transportation which have great route
flexibility in favour of a fixed link would greatly increase the
vulnerabi.lity of British trade with Europe to such risks as French
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strike action, economic sanctions, or other harassments.
The effects of constructing the Channel will certainly not be confined
to the countries at each end of it. Not only will neighbouring countries
such as Belgium and the Netherlands also be affected, but there will
be at least some consequences extending beyond Europe. With the pro-
vision of a land link to the rest of the continent's most intensely
developed area, Britain's position in a transatlantic context will
undergo some change. Britain is, isochronously, as near to the U.S
as it is to large parts of Europe. A reduction in flying time, though
slight, makes additional payload possible, and the straits of Dover
might make a great deal of sense as a transportation centre. There
are indications of interest among the French planners in the possi-
bility of siting a major international airport near Calais.
Finally, the impact of a tunnel must inevitably be heightened by
British entry into the Common Market. Much of the increased
traffic between Britain and Europe would naturally use the
Tunnel, and would presumably include a considerable amounr of
bulk freight at present the subject of seaborne traffic between the
Commonwealth and various ports in Britain. Even in the absence of
more knowledge of the revised patterns of trade it seems certain
that the attractivenoss of the South East as a distribution centre
would be enhanced at the expense of such centres elsewhere in the
United Kingdom.
U-
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Employment and- Population Movement.
Within South East England, the first trend will most probably be
towards growth in the Ashford region, and a decline, at least
initially, in employment within those areas presently dependent
upon the ferry services. Some compensatory employment will be
generated in Dover and Ramsgate by the hovercraft services if they
continue to prosper, but their operations are still confined to
the summer season. With the demand for land in the South East
at its present level, however, new industry will almost certainly
replace the port-based activities, although the degree of change
may cause transitional difficulties.
Over the longer term, however, theeffect of the Tunnel must be too
encourage the development of economic activity, and therefore the
supply of jobs, in the South East. Despite the housing shortage,
the scarcity of building land, high land costs, and the other
frictions already referred to which mie population distribittion
in Britain slow to teflect the movements of industry, the net
result must be further movement of population to South East
England.
Finally, given the juxtaposition of high unemployment in the
Calais region and labour shortage in prosperous South East
England, British membership of the Common Aarket and the lifting
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of existing obstacles to the mobility of labour must further
increasp this likelihood.
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PART III CONCLUSIM1
Comparison of Expected Impact
of the Channel Tunnel with the
Aims of Present Planning Policy.
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Comparison of the probable impact of the Channel Tunnel with the aims of
planning policy at a national level in Britain is interesting, because
in a sense the situation characterises the basic dilemna of current
policy. The basic objectives of that policy, it will be recalled, are
(a) the reduction of unemployment in those areas where it is markedly
above the national average, and (b) the relief of congestion in densely
populated urban areas. The approach towards the problem of unemployment
has not been one of infrastructural improvement, or of special treat-
ment at selected points with particularly good growth prospects. Instead,
it has been a policy of sending jobs to people by treating problem areas
preferentially until unemployment has dropped to tolerable levels,
whereupon the special treatment is promptly withdrawn. As has been pointed
out, these intermittent bursts of governmental attention have not resulted
in any real change in the national pattern of unemployment distribution,
although absolute levels of unemployment have been lower than before
World War II. The overall effect has been to bolster up the economies of
areas which are in decline, at the expense of foregoingseconomic expansion
in areas which have the potential for it.
And so to the case of the Channel Tunnel. One might argue that a tunnel
is not the best way of improving communications with Europe because of
cost, or vulnerability, or because other evolving technologies offer
better solutions. There seems to be little disagreement, however, that
improved communications with Europe can do little harm and may do a
M
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great deal of goot to the national economy, and the Channel Tunnel
would reprpsent an enormous investment towards the achievement of
that end. It has however been argued that, with reference to the two
main concerns of regional planning policy in Britain difined earlier,
the construction of a Tunnel is likely (a) to increase the attractive-
ness of the South East to development, and (b) to encourage population
growth in the region. With a third of the nation living there already,
a record of high employment, and the chairman of the British Airport
Authority rather tactlessly proclaiming that (1) the proposed third
London Airport would become the "largest employment agnet in the
region", the South East must be the last place in Britain, from the
standpoint of current policy, in which to encourage development.
The Tunnel proposal and current regional development policy in Britain
seem therefore to be at odds. As explained in the section on current
planning policy, however, the Board of Trade has made it amply clear
that, in implementing the Government's distribution of industry
policy, the national interest is, quite simply, not its concern, but
if the restrictive aspect of current policy is pursued, then Britain
will not only forego much of the potential benefit to be derived from
the redistribution of locational advatage, but may lose investment
(1) The airport is expected to provide 50,000 jobs, representing
an additional 150,000 population in the region.
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altogether. It seems quite conceivable that frustrated development
may find the North 6e1 of France a more attractive proposition than
the lagging regions of Britain. (1) The possibility of such a
confrontation between present policy and economic reality raises
questions of whether and how development policy might respond. It
is not proposed to pursue this in depth here, but mention should be
made of trends which may presage policy changes, in which case a
tunnel (or some comparable development) might make rather more
sense.
First is Britain's continuing economic plight. As the accompanying
graph shows, growth has lagged behind that of other European
countries, and it seems at least possible that the continuing
seriousness of the situation may force the Government to take a
second look at policies which seek a measure of regional equality
at the expense of development potential elsewhere.
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(1) See The Economist, July 24 1961.
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The recently published Hunt Report (2) tends to confirm this.
Altho-qgh primarily concerned with the so-called "grey areas",
the report raises issues of fundamental importance to develop-
ment policy in general, and makes a strong plea for a shift of
emphasis from the evening out of unemployment differentials in
favour of a policy of infrastructural investment in selected
"points of opportunity".
Whether or not the reccommendations of theHunt Committee are
adopted - and it is by no means certain that they will be -
the report represents a considerable shift in opinion at the
policy-making level.. Indeed, an extension of the principle is
conceivable whereby, instead of trying to create *)obs - any
jobs r even temporary ones - in the lagging regions, specific
relationships might be developed between the economies of such
areas and expanding activities in more prosperous areas. If
this were to happen, and the diversion of development gave way
to the inducement of favourable spin-off effects, then major
development in relatively prosperous regions Itka South East
England - such as a Channel Tunnel - might be seen not as some-
thing inconsistent with regional policy, but as an opportunity
to be exploited, and an economic fact of life to which regional
(1) The Intermediate Areas. Report of a committee under the
chairmanship of Sir Joseph Hunt; HMSO, April 1969.
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development policy might be advantageously related. The present
incompatiblity between Tunnel-and planning policy might then be
seen more clearly as lying less with the provision of a link than
with the policy it does not fit.
APPENDIX I : The Hunt Repott.
- -
The Hunt Report.
As this thesis was in the course of preparation, a committee headed
by Sir Joseph Hunt was completing an eighteen month study (1) of the
economic anatomy of Britain ( excluding Northern Ireland ), focussed
particularly on the"grey areas". Economically speaking, these lie
between the depressed regions, or development areas, and what Hunt
calls "the economic seedbeds " of South East England and the West
Midlands, and are areas whose economic growth gives cause for concern.
On April 24, 1969, the Hunt Committee published its report. As the
Times editorial observed next morning;"... the mass of detail, the
limited pragmatic recommendations and the Government's yet more limi-
ted reaction conceal the fact that the Hunt Committee want a major
change in the concept of regional policy. They have said that there
is no reason British industry in future should be tied to the geo-
graphical patterns of the Industrial Revolution."
In the same issue, Hunt's own article, headlined " the Geography of
Opportunity ", set out the main points of the report. He stated
categorically, and in direct contradiction of earlier official
attitudes already mentioned in this thesis, that the need is not
for a rapid creation of new jobs, but rather for investment " in
those more permanent assets which will help to make good the indus-
trial fabric and facilitate structural change." It would be quite
(1) The Intermediate Areas. Report of a committee under the chair-
manship of Sir Joseph Hunt : HMSO, April 1969.
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misguided, he observed, to attempt to persuade industry to move to
unsuitable areas ( which is precisely what has been done, witness the
spreading of the automobile industry's production lines over the length
and breadth of'Britain). " Far better", Hunt went on, " to invest in
carefully selected points of opportunity where conditions are favour-
able and by good communications to help people to travel and perhaps
eventually to move." This would appear to be much more than the tradi-
tional change of nomenclature whereby " depressed areas " become " growth
points", and goes so far as to violate the hallowed principle of moving
the jobs to the people. Furthermore it acknowledges that the provision
of an artificial boost to an industry does not necessarily guarantee
the maintenance of economic momentum when the preferential treatment
has been withdrawn.
The absence of prompt, decisive reaction from the Wilson Government is
sscarcely surprising in view of the feelings which the Hunt report is
bound to provoke in the regions at present receiving preferential
treatment as " development areas ". (1) The political situation is in
fact very complex, not to say paradoxical. By 1967 it had begun to be
clear that the Government's regional employent policies were taking
effect, and some perceptive commentators had pointed out that a
critical number of Labour votes might be lost unless something was
done to combat rising unemployment in the " grey areas ". At the same
(1) The Hunt Report does not advocate the withdrawal of aid from
development areas, but rather the removal of restrictions in other
areas, which has in the past had somewhat the same effect on the
former.
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time, development areas such as Scotland, traditionally a Labour
stronghold, have been increasingly restive, and significant inroads
on thepolitical scene have been made by the Nationalists, almost
entirely at the expense of Labour support. The present Govern-
ment, therefore, is in the position of being"damned if it does
and damned if it doesn't".
APPENDIX II: Chronology of the Iain Events
in the History of the
Channel Tunnel Proposals.
1802 Proposal to Napoleon by Albert Mathieu, a French engineer,
that a bored tunnel be constructed beneath the English Channel,
via the Ridge known as the Varne Bank, on which he envisaged an
island city.
1803 English proposal (by Mottray) for a steel tube resting on the
seabed. Start of the tunnel v. tube controversy.
1833-56 Geological and hydrographic research, and various proposals,
by Thome de Gamond, for bridges and a tube.
1856 Detailed proposal by Thom'de Gamond for a twin-track rail
tunnel, incorporating a harbour and ventilation shaft on the
Varne Bank. First scheme to be considered at Government level.
French enthusiastic; British less so.
1367 De Gamond in conjunction with two British engineers, Low and
Brunlees, presented a scheme for twin rail tunnels to the
Grosvenor Committee and Napoleon III. Approval halted by
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
1872 Formation of the Channel Tunnel Company.
1875 Anglo-French Submarine Raiway Company formed, proposing ttin
single -track tunnels.
Sir John Hawkshaw's 1869 scheme fa a single tunnel officially
adopted by the English Channel Tunnel Company.
Both companies, English and French, receive permission to
begin digging.
Start of digging on the French side, at Sangatte.
British begin two pilot diggings at Dover.
Growing public, political, and military opposition brought
British operations to a halt. French continued.
1883-4 Joint Select Committee investigation terminates operations.
1904-07 Revision of Low's proposals by Albert Sartiaux and Sir
Francis Fox, to incorporate electric traction. Military
opposition prevented further progress.
Discussions were resumed, but were quickly terminated by
the advent of World War I.
1918-24 Miscellaneous proposals, still against a background of mil-
itary opposition.
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1875
1878
1881
1882
1913
1929 Royal Commission appointed to re-examine the question.
1930 Royal Commission's report presented to the Channel Tunnel
Parlamentary Committee.
1938 Proposal to French Chamber for a road tunnel, based on a
design by Basdevant.
1939 World War II. In contrast to earlier military attitudes, the
Supreme Allied War Council queried whether a tunnel could be
built quickly enough to aid the war effort.
1947 Presentation by Basdevant of a scheme for a single tunnel, to
carry both road and rail traffic. D~ficient, from the British
point of view, geologically and in the provision for ventila-
tion.
1953 British Minister of Defence acknowledges that the strategic
argument against the Tunnel is no longer significant.
1957 Formation of the Channel Tunnel Study Group, involving French,
British, and American interests. Marine, geological, economic,
traffic, revenue, and engineering studies carried out.
1958 Basdevant's revised scheme for a single road-rail tunnel.
Report by the Channel Tunnel Study Group.1960
1961 Proposal by the Societe d'Etude du Pont sur la Manche.
1963 Report by working group set up by both Governments to study
the proposals submitted by the Channel Tunnel Study Group and
the Channel Bridge Group.
1966 British and French Governments agree that a Tunnel should be
built, subject to the agreement of sAtisfactory financial
arrangements.
U
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Impact of the St. Gotthard Tunnel.
There appears to be no situation sufficiently analogous to the Channel
Tunnel case to justify the drawing of any hard and fast conclusions. A cer-
tain similarity has, however, been suggested in the case of the St. Gotthard
Tunnel in Switzerland, between Chiasso and Altdorf, linking Italy by rail to
central and northern Europe. (1) Prior to the tunnel's completion, the only
alternative connection between the canton of Ticino and the rest of Switzer-
land was the road through the St. Gotthard Pass, which reaches an altitude of
over 6,000 feet above sea level. The rail tunnel remains a major transporta-
tion link in the region, and carries some 160 trains daily.
Werczberger cites two main effects on population growth and distribution as a
result of the tunnel. The first, and more obvious, was the temporary growth
of population during construction. The second was the result of improved
access created by the tunnel, which seems to have been a factor in the accele-
rated growth of Lugano, Bellinzona, and especially Chiasso, the customs con-
trol point.
Werczberger concludes that the major impact of the tunnel was not at the actual
entrances, but at those points in the vicinity which had industrial and popl-
lation growth potential which was activated by the construction of the Tunnel.
(1) Elia Werczberger; The Impact of the St. Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland.
Chapter 2, of Appendix II, in Channel Tunnel, a group paper by Messrs.
Osgood, Ostrower, Grosfils, and Werczberger, Dept. of City and Regional
Planning, HGSD, 1965.
The range of impact, not surprisingly, varied according to the state of
communications on either side of the Tunnel, and was more far reaching on
the Ticino side - which lacked any alternative connection with the rest of
Europe - than on the North.
Apart from the time interval (The St. Gotthard Tunnel was built between 1872
and 1882) comparison between the two schemes is difficult. When the St.
Gotthard Tunnel was built, the only way of transporting large quantities of
goods overland was by rail, and in this respect the context of the Channel
Tunnel proposals is rather different. Although car ferry facilities similar
to those proposed for the Channel Tunnel operate through the St. Gotthard
Tunnel, their introduction is recent and useful information about any resultant
impact has not yet become available.
U
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